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Sterilized foreign exchange market interventions are commonly dismissed by economists as an ineffective 
policy instrument. Nevertheless many central banks operating under independently floating exchange 
rates regimes are often engaged in sales and purchases of foreign exchange in order to manipulate the 
current value of their currencies. In this paper we argue that the skepticism of many economists can be 
ascribed to their orientation on fundamental-based, efficient-market exchange rate models. Given their 
weak empirical support, however, it is unreasonable to evaluate the effectiveness of sterilized foreign 
exchange interventions against the background of this class of models. Therefore, the purpose of this 
paper is to investigate the effectiveness of sterilized foreign exchange market interventions on the basis of 
a more suitable model. Using a chartist-fundamentalist model we show that central banks can influence 
exchange rates by using sterilized interventions. In particular, turning points occur earlier and exchange 
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  IV“If one recognises the reality that the FX markets contain many
participants who trade on the basis of past price momentum rather
then the underlying economic fundamentals, it is easy to see how
overshoots might occur. Those who trade currencies on the basis of
economic fundamentals obviously have to take the activities of the
momentum-based traders into account. Under some circumstances,
FX intervention can give the fundamentals-based traders greater
confidence to initiate positions during overshoots. Alternatively, in an
overextended market, intervention can sometimes directly affect the
behaviour of the momentum-based traders.” 
Sushil Wadhwani, former member of the Monetary Policy Committee
of the Bank of England; Speech to the Senior Business Forum At the
Centre for Economic Performance on 31 May 2000 
 
1 Introduction 
The use of official foreign exchange market interventions as a policy tool for affecting exchange rates is 
often subject to controversial disputes. Many opponents assert that official interventions are ineffective in 
changing exchange rates substantially. In practice, however, central banks are frequently engaged in sales 
and purchases of foreign exchange. 
The effectiveness of interventions is usually evaluated on the basis of three intervention channels: the 
monetary channel for non-sterilized interventions, the portfolio-balance channel and the signaling channel 
for sterilized interventions. All of these channels explain the impact of foreign exchange market 
interventions on the exchange rate using some variant of the asset pricing model of the exchange rate. 
Especially, the empirical evidence of the portfolio-balance and the signaling channel is rather mixed. 
However, this result cannot be simply ascribed to the ineffectiveness of central bank interventions, but 
moreover to the empirical failure of the underlying exchange rate model. Until today, economists do not 
possess a reasonable model based on macroeconomic fundamentals that can explain exchange rate 
movements over different time periods. 
From our point of view, it is therefore important to evaluate the effectiveness of interventions against 
the background of a reasonable exchange rate model. In recent years a new class of exchange rate models 
based on heterogeneous expectations has emerged. One particular specification is known as the chartists-
fundamentalists (c&f) model in which two different kinds of expectations are responsible for exchange 
rate dynamics. Thereby, the c&f model is able to capture observable exchange rate movements rather 
well.  
The purpose of our paper is to integrate the impact of central bank interventions in a c&f model. We 
show that due to interventions turning points in the exchange rate series occur earlier and exchange rate 
misalignments are substantially reduced. The remaining part of the study is as follows. In the next section 
we give a critical review of traditional intervention channels. Section 3 is concerned with the integration 
of sterilzed foreign exchange market interventions in a c&f model. We first discuss the c&f model and 
subsequently calibrate it. In the next step central bank interventions are incorporated, so that we are able 
to analyze their impact on exchange rates for various intervention strategies. The paper closes with a short 
conclusion and an outlook on future research issues.  
  12  A critical review of traditional intervention channels 
2.1  Interventions in the asset pricing model of the exchange rate 
The question how exchange rates are affected by central bank interventions in the foreign exchange 
market is closely related to the question how exchange rates are determined in general. The traditional 
intervention channels are based on variants of the asset pricing model of the exchange rate according to 
which the (log of the) spot rate   is determined by the present discounted sum of current and expected 
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In this kind of models expectations E  are formed rationally on the basis of the information set  t t Ω  
available at time t. The coefficient  ( ) /1 α− α  represents the discount factor. In order to specify the 
fundamentals entering the exchange rate model, for the purpose of the present paper it is convenient to 
focus on the basic arbitrage condition which is at the core of all exchange rate models, namely the 
uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition: 
 
f
tt t t 1 t t ii E s sr p +  −= Ω−+  t , (2) 
where   and   denote the domestic and the foreign nominal interest rate, and   is the risk premium 
required by risk averse international investors for holding risky assets. Solving equation (2) for s  yields 
the following asset price equation of the exchange rate: 
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With equation (3) at hand the traditional intervention channels can be easily explained (see 
Dominguez and Frankel, 1993, Edison, 1993, and Sarno and Taylor, 2001a, for comprehensive 
overviews). Non-sterilized foreign exchange market interventions involve a one-for-one change in the 
central bank’s net foreign assets and the monetary base. The change in base money leads to a change in 
the short-term interest rate i , and hence to a modified exchange rate path. Since this type of intervention 
simply is a variant of a central bank’s interest rate policy that can be distinguished from conventional 
open market operations only in the type of asset being exchanged for base money, the underlying 
intervention channel is called the monetary channel. However, central banks that operate under flexible 
exchange rates are predominantly engaged in sterilized foreign exchange market interventions which 
leave the primary monetary policy instrument i  unaffected. According to the portfolio-balance channel 
sterilized interventions change the relative stock of foreign to domestic assets which is held by the 
international investors. As risk averse asset holders are not indifferent to the currency composition of 
their portfolios, such a change alters the risk premium   that is required by the investors for holding the 
risky portfolio. The signaling channel by contrast explicitly exploits the asset price nature of the 




  2which induce them to alter their expectations about the future course of monetary policy, as measured by 
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The perceived usefulness of interventions as a monetary policy tool crucially depends on whether 
interventions are sterilized or not. On the one hand, the effectiveness of interventions through the 
monetary channel under flexible exchange rates is rarely questioned. Many authors argue like Marston 
(1988, p. 97): “There is virtually unanimous agreement among economists that non-sterilized intervention 
can affect exchange rates, just as more conventionally defined monetary policy can undoubtedly affect 
exchange rates” (see also Edison, 1993, p. 8, and Sarno and Taylor, 2001a, p. 841, for similar statements). 
On the other hand, most economists share a profound skepticism with regard to sterilized interventions 
which stems from the apparent empirical failure of the portfolio-balance channel and the signaling 
channel. Dominguez (2003, p. 1), for example, summarizes the empirical literature as follows: “(…) 
neither of these channels is easily reconciled with the empirical evidence, which suggests that sometimes 
intervention works and sometimes it does not.” In the 1980s most studies investigated the portfolio-
balance channel. While researchers typically concluded that risk premia exist and that they vary through 
time, they have not succeeded in relating these changes to relative asset supplies. With near unanimity, 
they have found the relationship to be either statistically insignificant or quantitatively unimportant. In the 
case of significant evidence, the effects on the exchange rate were too weak in order to attribute any 
importance to this channel. Because of the release of high frequency data and the publication of official 
intervention data the empirical focus shifted to the signaling channel in the 1990s. The most popular 
approach was to directly estimate the news character of current intervention on the exchange rate. Based 
on equation (1) one can derive the following estimation equation according to which changes in the spot 
rate   are assumed to occur in response to fundamental news   and to unexpected intervention 
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Thus, the basic technique of this approach is to directly estimate the influence of current interventions 
on exchange rate changes, over and above the contribution of the current fundamental. Empirical studies 
are, however, far from conclusive. Depending on the underlying sub-period and the intervening central 
bank, coefficients of the intervention variable are sometimes correctly signed and significant, sometimes 
insignificant, and sometimes significant and wrongly signed (for a summary of the empirical studies on 
the portfolio-balance channel and the signaling channel see the abovementioned overview articles). 
2.2  A criticism of the underlying exchange rate models 
The consensus view of economists on the effectiveness of non-sterilized and sterilized interventions 
reflects their belief in exchange rate models that rely on a fully efficient foreign exchange market in 
which the current exchange rate reflects all the relevant fundamental information available.  
On the one hand, the hypothesized connection of the exchange rate movements with movements in 
some fundamental determinants is of major importance for the discussion of the monetary channel and 
portfolio-balance channel. Using the weak empirical results in favor of the portfolio-balance channel as 
evidence against the effectiveness of sterilized foreign exchange market interventions would only be a 
valid argumentation if the portfolio-balance model of exchange rate determination is a convincing 
  3exchange rate theory. By the same token, the unanimous acceptance of the monetary channel of 
interventions requires an empirically stable relationship between the monetary policy instrument and 
exchange rates. 
On the other hand, the efficient market hypothesis – which is central for the signaling channel – 
becomes most evident if one takes a closer look at the underlying estimation techniques. Each 
econometric model such as the one given by equation (4), which can be derived from an asset price model 
of the exchange rate like equation (1), involves a joint hypothesis: the efficiency of the foreign exchange 
market and the effectiveness of the intervention policy. The former enters equation (4) through an 
application of the rational expectations approach, which simply takes ex post changes in the exchange 
rate as an unbiased measure of expected exchange rate changes. Most economists who argue that their 
results indicate that interventions cannot be viewed as an effective policy tool assume that the foreign 
exchange market efficiently maps new information into prices. From this point of view it is perfectly 
consistent to investigate the immediate effects of interventions on the exchange rate by using daily or 
intra-daily data. However, if one rejects the efficient markets hypothesis, it is not reasonable to draw any 
conclusions concerning the effectiveness of interventions on the basis of models that basically rely on this 
assumption.  
The empirical evidence suggests that both assumptions – fundamental based determination of 
exchange rates and efficient foreign exchange markets – have to be rejected. Under the catch phrase 
‘disconnect puzzle’ many caveats to a fundamental based determination of exchange rates are 
summarized. First, Messe and Rogoff (1983) have shown that fundamental exchange rate models perform 
less accurately than forecasts that do not rely on macroeconomic fundamentals at all. This holds true even 
under the assumption that market participants perfectly anticipate the future path of macroeconomic 
fundamentals. Second, Flood and Rose (1995) point out that the observable volatility of exchange rates 
increased in the post Bretton Woods area although the variability of macroeconomic fundamentals does 
not change very much across exchange rate regimes. This finding is essential as it suggests that 
fundamental based exchange rate models are unlikely to explain changes in the exchange rate. Third, 
Goldberg and Frydman (2001) and De Grauwe and Vansteenkiste (2001) report evidence for unstable 
coefficients in fundamental exchange rate models. With regard to the efficient market hypothesis, 
empirical evidence also advises skepticism. In efficient markets price movements are only due to the 
occurrence of new information about fundamentals. However, much of the daily spot exchange rate 
changes can not be associated with such news (see e.g. Galati and Ho, 2001). Furthermore, the results of 
studies analyzing survey expectations indicate that the assumption of rational expectations seems to be 
unsustainable (Bofinger and Schmidt, 2003). The efficient market hypothesis also implies that the current 
exchange rate should incorporate all information contained in past exchange rates, so that the 
extrapolation of past prices as it is suggested by technical analysis is futile. However, many studies report 
that the use of simple technical analysis tools can generate substantial profits (see Levich and Thomas, 
1993, and Okunev and White, 2003). In this context we should also refer to another stylized fact of 
international economics which contradicts the view of fundamental based exchange rate determination 
and efficient functioning of foreign exchange markets. As Engel and Hamilton (1990) have demonstrated 
freely floating exchange rates tend to move in long trends. However, these trends can not be related to 
  4macroeconomic fundamentals and may be responsible for the substantial profits related to the usage of 
technical analysis.  
To sum up, there is a huge amount of evidence that fundamentals-based exchange rate theories that 
rely on the efficient market hypothesis fail. In our view, it is therefore unfair to conclude that foreign 
exchange market interventions are an inefficient instrument when tested on the basis of empirically 
unsustainable exchange rate models. 
2.3  High trading volumes and foreign exchange market interventions 
Another argument typically raised against the effectiveness of foreign exchange market interventions, in 
particular along the lines of the portfolio-balance channel, is the high daily trading volume that can be 
observed in the foreign exchange market. Again, there is an important inconsistency when dismissing 
interventions for this reason. As has been pronounced by Frankel and Froot (1990, p. 92) trading volumes 
are incompatible with standard macroeconomic exchange rate models: “When a new piece of information 
becomes available, if all investors process the information in the same way and are otherwise identical, no 
trading needs to take place. The price of the asset should simply jump to its new value.” Thus, 
macroeconomic models implicitly assume that private demand for and supply of foreign exchange results 
from agents who all have access to the same information set and who all proceed the information in the 
same way by building homogeneous expectations. Moreover, these models assume a Walrasian 
auctioneer who collects preliminary customer orders and who uses them to find the market-clearing price. 
Accordingly, the auctioneer’s price adjustment is immediate and no trading needs to occur in transition. 
Frankel and Froot (1990, p. 92) continue: “To explain the volume of trading, some heterogeneity of 
investors is required.”  
And indeed, the foreign exchange market is characterized by a high degree of heterogeneity which 
basically occurs on two levels. First, the foreign exchange market is organized by a market maker system 
in which a single order submitted by a private agent leads to a multiple of turnover in the interdealer 
market (i.e. the market in which only market makers deal with each other), simply due to this specific 
pricing mechanism that gradually turns the initially private information of the market maker that has been 
contacted by the agent into public information (see Sarno and Taylor, 2001b, for an overview article 
about the ‘microstructure’ of the foreign exchange market). Second, the way private agents process 
information and form expectations deviates in many respects from the homogeneity assumption 
underlying the rational expectations paradigm. This second level will be at the core of the following 
analysis.  
In our view it is therefore important to take into account the institutional dimension of the foreign 
exchange market. Comparing the amount of a central bank’s sale or purchase of foreign exchange with 
the daily gross turnover in the foreign exchange market can be very misleading as it ignores the fact that 
roughly 60 per cent of this turnover is due to the market maker principle. Thus, a single intervention also 
produces a multitude of subsequent trades, and its possible impact on the exchange rate therefore has to 
be assessed on these grounds (Bofinger, 2000). 
  53  An alternative intervention channel – the coordination channel 
The objective of this section is to integrate foreign exchange market interventions in a realistic exchange 
rate model. We choose a c&f model because it captures important characteristics of the actual exchange 
rate dynamics. In particular, the c&f model allows for long swings that are disconnected from 
fundamentals. Moreover, it considers heterogeneous expectations which is undoubtedly a more realistic 
description of reality. Finally, this framework enables us to incorporate important institutional aspects of 
the foreign exchange market. 
3.1  The chartist-fundamentalist exchange rate model 
The class of c&f models goes back to Frankel and Froot (1990), and has been enhanced among others by 
De Grauwe and Dewachter (1993), Frenkel (1997), Grimaldi and De Grauwe (2003) and Westerhoff 
(2003). Basically, c&f models can be assigned to the noise trader approach propagated by Shleifer and 
Summers (1990). Within the noise trader framework heterogeneous expectations are introduced to capture 
the observable dynamics of exchange rates more appropriately. Usually, two different kinds of 
expectations formation are considered: the first one can be assigned as ‘fundamental’ expectations as they 
are guided by the fundamental value of the exchange rate. The second kind of expectations is often 
denoted as ‘irrational’. These expectations are based on noisy information which are worthless with 
regard to the fundamental value. Black (1986) introduced the term noise for this worthless information 
and concludes that “people sometimes trade on noise as if it were information” (Black, 1986, p. 529). The 
introduction of ‘irrational’ expectations in exchange rate models allows for modeling deviations of the 
actual exchange rate from its fundamental value. 
Basically, the foreign exchange market can be described as a decentralized multiple-dealer market. 
Trading in foreign exchange market is dominated by two different groups of financial agents. The first 
group is comprised of all agents who act as customers in the market (e.g. fund managers, hedge funds, 
exporting and importing firms etc.). They buy and sell currencies according to the needs of their business 
activities. As customers’ demand and supply usually do not match, a second group of agents is needed to 
take up the excess demand of customers. In foreign exchange markets these agents are called market 
makers. Market makers ensure that all customer buying and selling orders are fulfilled instantaneously. 
Farmer and Joshi (2002) show that in markets, which are organized by this principle, prices evolve 
according to the following price impact function: 
  t1 t t sse + d = +α . (5) 
According to equation (5), the change in the (log) exchange rate s from period t to t+1 arises from the 
excess demand in period t. The factor α can be interpreted as the elasticity of the (net) order size with 
respect to the exchange rate change. The cause of excess demand are the trading decisions of foreign 
exchange market customers. Within our model, we distinguish two different kinds of customers: 
  Financial investors such as fund managers are concerned with professional investment purposes. To 
account for both fundamental and ‘irrational’ trading behavior we assume that financial investors 
base their investment decisions either on fundamental trading rules or on trading rules resulting from 
technical analysis. The fundamental trading rule can be concretized as a function of the fundamental 
  6value of the exchange rate and the actual spot rate. The rationale for this trading rule is that the actual 
spot rate may diverge from its fundamental value for a certain amount of time but it will back up 
towards its fundamental value over time. Thus, financial investors using a fundamental trading rule 
try to profit from buying a certain currency if they think it is undervalued and selling it if they think it 
is overvalued. The fundamental trading rule is given by 
  ( )
f
tt df s t = γ−, (6) 
where γ is a positive parameter that determines the speed of the expected adjustment and ft represents 
the (log) fundamental exchange rate. In our model we assume that that the fundamental exchange rate 
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where β is a positive model parameter which accounts for the degree of extrapolation. This trading 
rule reflects a simple n-day moving average rule that is often used by practitioners. The rationale for 
this trading rule will be discussed in detail in Section 3.2 below. 
  Liquidity traders trade in foreign exchange markets due to their liquidity requirements, i.e. they do 
not trade in foreign exchange markets due to investment objectives but for payment transactions 
arising from their ordinary business activities (imports and exports). It is assumed that their demand is 
purely random, i.e. 
l
t ξ  follows an IID white noise process. 
After the introduction of all relevant foreign exchange market participants, we now can summarize the 
total excess demand of customers as follows: 
  ( )
cf
tt t ed md 1 m d
l
t = +− + ξ , (8) 
where m measures the degree of which investment decisions are taken on the basis of technical analysis.
  
In contrast to the papers by Frankel and Froot (1990), De Grauwe and Dewachter (1993), Grimaldi 
and De Grauwe (2003) and Westerhoff (2003) the parameter m is kept constant in this paper, implying a 
strictly linear model. While a linear model produces some time series charateristics that are clearly at 
odds with the stylized facts, the main advantage is that it remains simple and analytically tractable so that 
standard solution methods can be applied (see also Frenkel, 1997, for a similar approach). This approach 
enables us to determine optimum intervention strategies in a linear-quadratic framework which is a major 
purpose of the paper. Nevertheless, we will come back to this point in our outlook for future research at 
the end of the paper. 
3.2  Discussion of the c&f exchange rate model 
This section deals with an empirical justification for the introduction of non-fundamental trading practices 
into an exchange rate model. Hereunto, we draw from the results of interviews conducted with foreign 
exchange market participants. One of the first who questioned traders were Taylor and Allan (1992). 
Their results indicate that large parts of foreign exchange traders rest their expectations formation upon 
technical analysis – at least in the short and medium-run. More recently, Cheung et al. (2000), Cheung 
  7and Wong (2000) and Cheung and Chinn (2001) systematically analyzed the British, Asian and American 
foreign exchange markets by using questionnaires. Their results with respect to the importance of 
‘irrational’ factors determining the expectations formation of market participants are summarized in Table 
1. Obviously, market participants think unanimously that irrational factors play a key role in the 
determination of exchange rates in the short and medium-run, but also in the long-run some ‘irrational’ 
influences are suggested. 
Table 1: Relative importance of fundamental and irrational factors for the determination of 
exchange rates
♥ 
   Intraday 
Medium-run 
(≤ 6 months) 
Long-run 
(> 6 months) 
Rational fundamental 
factors  0.6% 31.4%  82.5%  UK Foreign Exchange 
Market (Cheung et al., 
2000)  Irrational non-
fundamental factors  97.7% 67.2% 15.4% 
Rational fundamental 
factors  0.7% 32.2%  79.6%  Asian Foreign 
exchange markets
♣ 
(Cheung and Wong, 
2000) 
Irrational non-
fundamental factors  99.3% 67.8% 20.4% 
Rational fundamental 
factors  0.8% 32.1%  87.4%  US Foreign exchange 
market (Cheung and 
Chinn, 2001)  Irrational non-
fundamental factors  98.6% 66.8%  9.4% 
♣ Values represent the average of the three Asian trading centers Hong Kong, Tokyo, and Singapore 
♥ The relevant question in the survey is: select the single most important factor that determines exchange rate 
movements (see e.g. Cheung et al., 2000, p. 21). 
 
A persuasive theoretical rationale for the introduction of ‘irrational’ trading practices is recently given 
by the literature on Behavioral Economics. Within this literature the concept of economic rationality 
which is at the core of basically all traditional exchange rate models is seriously queried. An essential 
implication of economic rationality is that agents are able to process all available information using the 
‘right’ economic model. That is, agents do not suffer from any cognitive limitations. This implication 
appears against the background of psychological evidence to be pretty unrealistic as psychological 
research shows that agents must make inferences under limited time, limited knowledge and limited 
computational capacities. Consequently, they are not able to determine an exact rational solution, as the 
economic theory usually supposes (Gigerenzer, 1997). 
Against the background of limited cognitive resources, psychologists have investigated the processes 
through which agents reach their decisions. Their results suggest that agents tend to use simple heuristics 
to reduce the complexity of the decision situation. A simple heuristics is thereby defined as a simple rule 
of thumb, which allows quick and efficient decisions even under high uncertainty (Fiedler and Bless, 
2001). Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) have shown that there are many heuristics that provide a reasonable 
compromise between economic rationality and an efficient use of scarce human cognitive resources. 
However, there are also circumstances where simple heuristics lead to systematically biased judgments 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1999). 
In the context of foreign exchange markets, technical analysis can be interpreted as a simple heuristics 
that allows each individual market participant to easily reach an investment decision (Goldberg, 1997, 
  8Goldberg and von Nitzsch, 2001). The purpose of technical analysis is to extract information about future 
rates from past realization. Thus, it is an attempt to exploit recurring and predictable patterns in exchange 
rates. Pring (2003, p.2) describes the main objective of technical analysis as follows: “the technical 
approach to investment is essentially a reflection of the idea that the […] market moves in trends which 
are determined by the changing attitudes of investors to a variety of economic, monetary, and 
psychological forces. The art of technical analysis, for it is an art, is to identify changes in such trends at 
an early stage and to maintain an investment posture until a reversal of that trend is indicated.” In foreign 
exchange markets, technical analysis can be seen as a widespread tool used by practitioners when forming 
expectations about future exchange rates. Table 2 summarizes the relative importance of technical 
analysis according to the studies of Menkhoff (1998), Cheung and Chinn (2001) and Gehrig and 
Menkhoff (2004). All three studies show that technical analysis is a prominent tool for the expectation 
formation of foreign exchange market participants. 
Table 2: The importance of technical analysis in foreign exchange markets 
  Technical 
analysis 
Fundamental 
analysis  Order flow  Other 
Menkhoff (1998)  37.2% 44.9  17.9  -- 
Cheung and Chinn (2001)  30% 25% 22% 23% 
Gehrig and Menkhoff (2004)  35.8% 29.4% 17.4% 17.4% 
 
A key characteristic of simple heuristics is their usefulness for a wide range of applications. For 
technical analysis this requirement seems to be fulfilled as many empirical studies have shown that 
technical trading rules are profitable. Okunev and White (2003) analyze the profitability of momentum-
based strategies in various foreign exchange markets. Their results indicate that the potential exists for 
investors to generate excess returns by adapting a simple moving average rule. This finding is robust to 
the time periods under consideration, the base currency of reference and the benchmark of comparison. 
Similar results for the profitability of technical analysis in foreign exchange markets are also reported by 
e.g. Neely (1997) and Chang and Osler (1999). 
Some researches, however, ascribe the profitability of technical analysis merely to central bank 
interventions in foreign exchange markets (see e.g. LeBaron, 1999). They argue that monetary authorities 
are willing to take losses on their trading as their objectives are to maintain orderly market conditions and 
not to make profits. Thus, the profitability of technical analysis may represent a transfer from central 
banks to technical traders (see Szakmary and Mathur, 1997). In this context, Neely (1998) shows that 
central bank interventions are generally against the position taken by technical traders who guess the sign 
of excess return right so that interventions seems to be unprofitable at least in the short-run. However, this 
argumentation appears to be more than equivocal. On the one hand, trading rules also generate excess 
profits in other asset markets such as e.g. stock markets where no official interventions occur (see e.g. 
Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993, 2001). On the other hand, the empirical results of Neely (2002) advise that 
central bank interventions respond to exchange rate trends which are responsible for the profitability of 
technical trading rules. Furthermore, empirical studies on the profitability of central bank interventions 
reveal that in the long-run interventions generate substantial profits for monetary authorities (see e.g. 
  9Leahy, 1995, Sweeney, 2000, Saacke, 2002, and Ito, 2002). Thus, it would be reasonable for investors to 
trade in accordance with central banks instead of taking the opposite position.  
The crucial point in the context of intervention effectiveness is the considered time horizon. If the 
objective of central bank interventions is to break existing trends it may take longer to realize this change. 
This suggestion is supported by the empirical findings of Saacke (2002) who shows that profitability only 
occurs in the longer-run (after 26 days positive impact, statistically significant after 330 days), meaning 
that in the short-run the response of exchange rates to interventions is either insignificant or has the wrong 
sign. However, in the longer-run his results indicate that exchange rates tend to move in a manner 
consistent with the central bank’s intentions. This result is in line with previous findings suggesting that 
in the longer-run central bank interventions affect exchange rates in the desired direction, but that in the 
short-run the central bank is likely to experience losses (see e.g. Goodhart and Hesse, 1993). 
3.3  Calibration of the baseline c&f exchange rate model  
In this section we choose appropriate model parameters for a daily exchange rate model. Even though c&f 
models already enjoy a great popularity, there is yet no convincing econometric work that we could rely 
on. Our calibration is therefore mainly based on plausibility considerations. We assume that the relative 
weight of chartism m in the financial investor’s decision process is constant and equal to 0.5. This 
roughly reflects the survey results summarized in Table 2. The chartists extrapolate the exchange rate 
according to a 50-day moving average so that n 50 = . The fundamental exchange rate is assumed to 
follow a near-random walk 
 
f
t1 t t1 f0 . 9 9 f + + = +ξ . (9) 
We excluded a pure random walk to maintain the stationarity of the model’s variables which is a crucial 
prerequisite for the applicability of the numerical algorithms used below. For simplicity we set the scaling 
factor α  equal to one. 
For the choice of the parameters β and   we took the following criteria into account. First, the 
exchange rate process should be stable. As a general rule, the higher the impact of chartists (the lower the 
impact of fundamentalists) on the exchange rate, i.e. the higher 
γ
β (the lower  ), the more unstable the 
evolution of the exchange rate, i.e. the more persistent the misalignments. Second, the exchange rate 
should oscillate around the fundamental exchange rate after a single shock so as to get endogenous 
‘swings’. Here the rule is that the higher the impact of both, chartists and fundamentalists, on the 
exchange rate, the higher the frequency with which the exchange rate oscillates. Figure 1 summarizes 
these results. Parameter combinations above the dashed oscillation frontier lead to an exchange rate 
process that oscillates around its fundamental value. Parameter combinations below the solid stability 
frontier lead to a stable exchange rate process. The final choice of 
γ
β and   is somewhat arbitrary. We set 
 and  , because this parameter combination produced ‘realistic’ simulated exchange rate 
time series (see Figure 2 and Figure 3). 
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Figure 2: Responses to a one s.d. liquidity trader shock for varying model parameters 
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  11Concerning the variances of the shock processes we proceeded as follows. Shocks resulting from 
liquidity traders are modeled as white noise processes with  . The higher we set the 
variance, the more pronounced the oscillations around the fundamental value (see Figure 3 and Figure 4). 
For the calibration of   we tried to take into account the stylized fact that the turnover resulting 
from this kind of foreign exchange market activity accounts for roughly 50  % of the customer 
transactions in the foreign exchange market (see Table 3 below). This figure was calculated as the 
average absolute value of liquidity traders’ demand in a stochastic simulation of the model over 100000 
periods. Shocks resulting from the fundamental exchange rate (the so-called unpredictable news) are also 
modeled as a white noise process. In contrast to the liquidity trader shocks, however, the variance of the 
unpredictable news has very little impact on the course of the spot exchange rate, at least as long as we 
modeled the fundamental exchange rate as a process that exhibits much less volatility than the spot rate. 
We somewhat arbitrarily set  . 
(
2 l
t Var 0.003  ξ=  )
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  12Figure 4: Impulse-responses for different shock sizes 
response to a one s.d. liquidity trader shock  response to a one s.d. fundamental shock 
response to a 0.004 liquidity trader shock  response to a 0.003 fundamental shock 
3.4  Interventions in the chartist-fundamentalist model 
A central bank that buys and sells foreign exchange enters the model as an additional customer in the 
foreign exchange market. The excess demand is then defined as the weighted sum of chartist and 
fundamentalist demand, plus the central bank’s foreign exchange market intervention, plus the demand of 
liquidity traders: 
  ( )
cf
tt t t ed md 1 m d I
l
t = +− ++ ξ , (10) 
where   measures the central bank’s demand for foreign exchange. The sterilization of interventions is 
broadly defined. Sterilized interventions do not only leave the short-term interest rate unaffected, but also 
all kinds of fundamental determinants of the exchange rate (which, for example, could be the risk 
premium if one believes in uncovered interest parity). For this reason there is no need to further specify a 
model of how the fundamental exchange rate is determined. 
t I
Following theoretical intervention studies (see e.g. Almekinders, 1995), interventions are modeled in 
terms of an intervention response function 
  t IF y t = , (11) 
where   is a column vector of state variables, and F defines a row vector containing the response 
coefficients. The structure of F will be determined in accordance with typical central bank behavior. 
According to Jurgensen (1983) widely used strategies for the implementation of foreign exchange market 
interventions are exchange rate targeting and leaning-against-the-wind. A central bank that follows an 
t y
  13exchange rate targeting rule intervenes in the foreign exchange market if the exchange rate deviates from 
its fundamental value. Under a leaning-against-the-wind strategy the central bank does not refer to any 
specific target value, such as the fundamental exchange rate. It simply intervenes in a way to counter past 
exchange rate movements (see Almekinders and Eijffinger, 1996, for this definition). 
For the evaluation of intervention policies we have to specify an objective function. In dynamic 










  ∑  (12) 
where we defined the period loss as 
  [ ] [ ] tt Loss Var mis Var I =+ λ t , (13) 
with a weight   and a discount factor 0 0 λ≥ 1 < δ≤ . Using this formulation we assume that the central 
bank is concerned with the misalignment mist of the exchange rate (which is defined as the percentage 
deviation of the spot exchange rate from its fundamental value,  t sf t − ), but that it also faces a cost when 
using its intervention instrument.  
The rationale for including these costs is twofold. First, the central bank faces a ‘hard budget 
constraint’ as the sales of foreign exchange cannot exceed the central bank’s stock of foreign exchange 
reserves. The inclusion of the amount of intervention in the loss function therefore limits the average 
amount of intervention so that the probability of reaching the constraint is very low. It can be shown that 
the (non-linear) constraint that the intervention volume must be below a certain threshold in every period 
can be replaced with a (linear) constraint upon its variability (Woodford, 2003, Chapter 6). 
Second, there are also costs of interventions which are related to being detected by the market. In 
general, foreign exchange market interventions are not publicly announced and are conducted secretly; 
details of the intervention are sometimes published after the intervention took place, but with a time lag of 
several weeks (see Chiu, 2003, for a survey of actual central bank practices). While under the traditional 
intervention channels (in particular the signaling channel) the secrecy of interventions appears to be 
puzzling, it can be explained quite well in a c&f model. As has already been noted by Hung (1997), the 
channel by which interventions influence exchange rates in a model with heterogeneous agents centers 
around the question of how a central bank is able to alter the behavior of the chartists which are 
responsible for the misalignment. There is no doubt that a central bank – like any other big player in the 
market – is able to exert a transitory effect on the exchange rate. But if this transitory effect of 
intervention causes chartists to revise their position because the current spot rate is much closer to the 
moving average or even breaks it, the temporary effect will last longer. The higher the amount of 
intervention, however, the more exceptional the order and the more markets become suspicious. And in 
the context of financial markets suspicion means that the rules according to which expectations about 
future exchange rates are formed are likely to change. A typical scenario in response to a foreign 
exchange market intervention would be a bet against the central bank that is likely to accelerate an 
already existing trend. 
A crucial exercise of our paper concerns the calibration of the objective function. As far as the 
discount factor is concerned, we are in line with the standard literature by setting  . The choice of the  1 δ=
  14weight   requires a little more consideration. The purpose of the calibration of the loss function was to 
get an average intervention volume of our central bank that is close to that of the Japanese monetary 
authorities.
λ
1 The reason for choosing the Bank of Japan as the benchmark is that the bank regularly 
intervened in the JPY/USD market all over the 1990s and that it publishes the daily intervention data. In 
the period between April 1991 and June 2003 the average intervention volume was 1.4 billions of USD, if 
only days are considered on which interventions actually took place (see Figure 5). The relevant market 
for foreign exchange market interventions is the spot foreign exchange market (Neely, 2001). According 
to the Bank for International Settlements the average daily customer-initiated foreign exchange market 
turnover in the JPY/USD spot market roughly amounts to 40 billions of USD (40 % of 100 billions of 
USD, see Table 3). Thus, the average intervention volume represents about 3.6 % of the average daily 
customer transactions. For the calibration of λ  we now assumed that the central bank implements its 
intervention according to an optimal reaction function that follows if the central bank minimizes the loss 
function (12) subject to the c&f model (equations (5), (6), (7) and (10)). The higher we set  , the lower 
the average intervention activity of the central bank is which we calculated as the average absolute value 
of   in a stochastic simulation of the model over 100000 periods. For 
λ
t I 150000 λ =  we finally got an 










Table 3: Structure of the Japanese foreign exchange market 














   in billions of USD  in percent of spot market turnover 
1995  242.0  87.7  62.4% 18.6% 16.6% 
1998  266.6  120.5 58.9% 17.1% 24.0% 
2001  231.4  80.9  56.6% 28.7% 14.6% 
Source: Bank for International Settlements (2002) 
Figure 5: Frequency distribution of Japanese interventions (04/1991 – 06/2003) 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Interventions in billions of USD
Observations 250
Mean      1.435161
Maximum   20.14296






0 10 20 30 50
Interventions in % of average daily FX turnover
Observations 250
Mean    
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Data source: Homepage of the Japanese Ministry of Finance (http://www.mof.go.jp) 
 
1 To be precise, both, the Bank of Japan and the Ministry of Finance are responsible for the conduct of foreign 
exchange market interventions. For simplicity, we will refer to the Bank of Japan from now an. 
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The optimum intervention reaction function uses all information available from the exchange rate 
model. Thus, the central bank buys and sells foreign exchange in response to a function of the weighted 
average of the entire state vector   in which the weights are determined according to a dynamic 
optimization procedure (see Söderlind, 1999, for details). 
t y
As has been described in the introduction of section 3.4 central banks usually adopt some more simple 
intervention strategies, rather than an optimal reaction function. In contrast to the latter a simple 
intervention rule only uses a small subset of information variables. An exchange rate targeting central 
bank pursues the following rule:  
  ( )
target
tt If fs =− t
0
, (14) 
where  . Thus, it sells foreign exchange when the spot rate exceeds the fundamental exchange 
rate and it buys foreign exchange when the spot rate is below the fundamental exchange rate. In a daily 
model the leaning-against-the-wind strategy can have – at least – two dimensions. Depending on the 
length of the period entering the intervention rule we can distinguish between a moving-average (MA) 
rule and a smoothing rule. A central bank that follows an MA rule tries to resist an existing medium-term 
exchange rate trend. It sells foreign exchange when the spot rate is above some moving average line and it 



















where  . By contrast, a central bank that smoothes exchange rates is supposed to resist large short-
term (e.g. day-to-day) movements in the exchange rate:  
MA f >
  ( )
smooth
tt 1 If s s − = t − , (16) 
where  . 
smooth f0 >
For the determination of the response coefficients we minimized the policy maker’s intertemporal loss 
function, this time, however, on a restricted set of state variables as given by equations (14), (15) and (16)
. In other words, for each of the simple intervention rules we calculated the optimum response 
coefficients  ,   and  . For the MA rule we set 
target f
MA f
smooth f n5 0 = . The results of the restricted 
optimization are shown in Table 4. The variance of the misalignment and the loss are expressed in per 
cent of the outcome that would result if the central bank abstained from any foreign exchange market 
intervention. The last column shows the performance of the optimum intervention rule. It serves as a 
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Table 4: Structure and performance of intervention rules in the c&f model 







without intervention  100.00  100.00  0.0 % 
targeting rule         
optimized:  () tt I 0.0012 f s =− t   66.50 79.62 3.1  % 
volume-adjusted:  () =− tt I0 . 0 0 1 4 fs t   61.68 79.78 3.6  % 






















I0 . 0 0 4 9 s s
50
−  t i t   53.85 74.11 3.6  % 
smoothing rule       
optimized:  () tt 1 I0 . 0 1 9 s s − =− t   88.37 93.45 2.0  % 
volume-adjusted:  () − =− tt 1 I0 . 0 3 3 s s t   81.40 96.60 3.6  % 
optimum intervention rule  43.96 66.81 3.6  % 
Notes: 
♣ unconditional variances in % of the model without interventions, analytically computed;
 
♥ obtained from stochastic simulations of the model (100000 periods). 
 
Table 4 shows that with relatively small (and above all realistic) intervention volumes the 
misalignment of the exchange rate can be reduced substantially. There are, however, important 
differences between the three rules. By dampening the average misalignment to 58 % the MA rule clearly 
performs best, closely followed by the targeting rule. The smoothing rule, by contrast, does not seem to 
be very successful. It only reduces the variance of the misalignment to 88 % of the misalignment without 
intervention. The Table further shows that the relative average intervention volume of the optimized 
intervention rules is somewhat lower than 3.6 %. For this reason we adjusted the response coefficients in 
a way to produce this intervention volume (the ‘volume-adjusted’ row in the Table, written in italics). As 
all intervention rules become more aggressive the average misalignment of the exchange rate can be 
further reduced, of course at the cost of a higher loss. This higher loss, in particular for the smoothing 
rule, results out of the higher variance of the intervention instrument. 
Figure 6 depicts the impulse responses with and without foreign exchange market intervention. We 
focused our analysis on the response to liquidity trader shocks, as these shocks are – in comparison with 
the fundamental shocks – the driving force of the model. According to the smoothing rule the central 
bank reacts to a shock in the exchange rate with a huge sale of about 0.69 billion USD in period 1, which 
is admittedly not discernible in the figure. However, afterwards only minor intervention activities are 
observed. Overall, interventions according to the smoothing rule induce a reduction of the exchange rate 
amplitude by dampening exchange rate changes. Compared to the three other interventions rules the total 
effect of interventions appears to be small. This is consistent with the results of Table 4.  
  17Figure 6: Interventions in response to a one s.d. liquidity trader shock 
Smoothing rule  targeting rule 
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Note: The charts show the intervention response according to the optimized intervention rules. On the right scale we depicted the scaled intervention volume. When the 
central bank follows the optimal intervention rule that results for  150000 λ = , the average daily turnover due to fundamentalists’, chartists’ and liquidity traders’ activity is 
around 0.0033. This figure was obtained by simulating the model with the baseline calibration over a sufficiently long time horizon (e.g. 100000 periods) and by computing 
the mean of the sum of the absolute values of 
c md , 
f (1 m)d −  and 
l
t t t ξ  (because turnover is a gross figure). Given the average daily foreign exchange market turnover in the 
JPY/USD market, we have to multiply the turnover figures resulting from our model by 12100 so as to get reasonable turnovers when expressed in billions of USD. (Note that 
the average turnover due to fundamentalists’ and chartists’ activity would also be around 0.0033 if the central bank abstained from any intervention activity. Thus, there is 
almost no feedback from central bank trades on private market particpants trades.) 
 18 
A central bank that follows a targeting rule sells (buys) foreign exchange if it is overvalued 
(undervalued) against the fundamental value. By doing so the central bank initially counteracts the 
existing trend. However, after the trend reversal, the central bank pushes the exchange rate further 
towards the fundamental value. This intervention strategy results in reduction of the amplitude in the first 
upward swing. Subsequently the size of the amplitude remains unchanged due to the trend consistent 
interventions after the trend reversal. Nonetheless, the frequency of the swings is reduced. With regard to 
the timing of the trend reversal Figure 6 shows that interventions according to the targeting rule lead to an 
earlier trend reversal compared to the non-intervention situation. 
The MA rule and the optimum rule show a quite similar intervention pattern. According to both 
intervention rules central banks sell foreign exchange when the domestic currency depreciates and buy 
foreign exchange when the domestic currency appreciates. A closer look at the above charts, however, 
reveals that under an optimum rule the switch from sales to purchases (and from purchases to sales) lags 
somewhat behind the turning point of the exchange rate. In other words, the central bank initially leans 
with the wind and pushes an already existing trend. This behavior cannot only be observed under 
optimum interventions, but also if the central bank follows an MA rule. The basic difference between the 
MA and the optimum rule compared to the targeting rule is the fact that according to the former less trend 
consistent interventions are conducted. Therefore, the MA rule and the optimal rule reduce the amplitude 
of the impulse response substantially. Like the targeting rule the MA rule and the optimal rule induce an 
earlier trend reversal compared to the non-intervention situation. 
Overall, these results put across that the total effects of a single intervention definitely do not become 
apparent within a few hours or a day, which is typically the investigated time period in standard time 
series studies. Furthermore it seems to be rather likely that a sequence of sterilized interventions dampens 
the amplitude of exchange rate swings and thus reduces the economic costs of exchange rate 
misalignments. Moreover, a sequence of interventions is likely to forward the breaking of an existing 
exchange rate trend. 
Our results are largely in line with the noise trading channel hypothesis of sterilized foreign exchange 
market interventions put forward by Hung (1991a, 1991b, 1997). “The hypothesis maintains that (...) 
central banks can use well-designed intervention strategies to induce noise traders to buy or sell a 
currency in such a way that the otherwise temporary effect of sterilized intervention is longer-lasting” 
(Hung, 1997, p. 782). It is uncontested that each sale or purchase of foreign exchange has a temporary 
effect on the exchange rate, simply by the order flow it creates (see equation (5)). The long-run 
effectiveness of the intervention then crucially depends on its impact on the expecatation formation 
process of other market participants. If intervention is conducted secretly chartists are unable to discern 
the sources of additional demand for or supply of foreign exchange and may incorporate the latest spot 
rate movement into their trendline analysis. Since chartists put more weight to the most recent exchange 
rate movement, it is likely that they may interpret the effect of intervention as a first indication of a trend 
reversal and adjust their position accordingly. 
  194  Conclusion and outlook for future research 
In this paper we have tried to investigate the effectiveness of sterilized foreign exchange market 
interventions against the background of a chartist-fundamentalist exchange rate model. Our basic result is 
that central banks can influence exchange rates by the means of sterilized interventions. In particular, 
turning points of exchange rate swings around the fundamental exchange rate occur earlier and the degree 
of exchange rate misalignments is substantially reduced. The performance of the intervention policy 
crucially depends on the strategy with which the policy is implemented. While attempts to counter day-to-
day exchange rate movements (a so-called exchange rate smoothing strategy) do not turn out to be very 
successful, a moving average rule and an exchange rate targeting rule perform relatively well. These 
results are also confirmed by actual intervention policies. Using a Logit model, Frenkel et al. (2002) 
investigated the determinants of foreign exchange market interventions of the Bank of Japan. They found 
that the Japanese authorities followed some variant of a moving average rule and a targeting rule, whereas 
the smoothing rule turned out to be insignificant. 
Of course there is a range of possible extensions and modifications that can and will be considered in 
future works. A first issue concerns the formulation of the intervention policy. While our model assumes 
that the central bank intervenes continuously over time, a stylized fact of interventions is that they occur 
sporadically and in clusters (see Frenkel et al., 2002, for a detailed description of the Japanese 
intervention policy). Thus, instead of modelling interventions in terms of a policy rule such as (14), (15) 
or (16), intervention policy could be formulated as a non-linear intervention rule. One way to introduce 
the non-linearity would be to make the intervention intensity depend quadratically on the distance of the 
spot rate from the fundamental exchange rate or the moving average. Alternatively, one could define one 
or several thresholds from which interventions would take place. In the literature on interest rate rules 
such a policy is known as ‘the opportunistic approach’ (Orphanides and Wilcox, 2002). Additionally, one 
could also think of designing an asymmetric intervention response function. Central banks typically 
prefer to resists an appreciation of their currency since this policy faces no quantitative limits. 
The second and maybe more crucial modification that will be performed in the future concerns the 
underlying exchange rate model. While our model is able to replicate some important stylized facts of 
actual exchange rate behavior, above all the endogenously generated long swings of the spot exchange 
rate around the fundamental rate, our simulated exchange rate time series unfortunately exhibit a high 
degree of autocorrelation in their returns which is clearly in opposition to the stylized facts. As high 
frequency exchange rate series typically display a unit root (see e.g. Goodhart et al., 1993), exchange rate 
changes usually appear to be unpredictable in the short-run. In our model the source of the high 
autocorrelation in returns is the constant 50 % share of chartists who simply extrapolate the past into the 
future at each point in time. One way to avoid the short-run predictability of exchange rate returns is to 
render the model non-linear. Grimaldi and De Grauwe (2003), for example, set up a model in which the 
weight given to chartists and fundamentalists depends on the profitability of the forecasting rules applied 
by them and the risk associated with their use. In addition to avoiding autocorrelation in the returns, this 
approach is capable of explaining important anomalies of foreign exchange markets, such as the 
emergence of bubbles. While our linear model specification always implies a convergence of the spot 
exchange rate to its fundamental value, irrespective of the initial conditions, a non-linear specification 
  20may result in multiple equilibria. This opens the way for a new role of foreign exchange market 
interventions. Instead of altering the history of the exchange rate time series (as in the noise trading 
channel described in this paper), central banks may acts as a coordinator between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
equilibria. In the words of Sarno and Taylor (2001a, p. 863): “Publicly announced intervention operations 
can here be seen as fulfilling a coordinating role in that they may organize the ‘smart money’ to enter the 
market at the same time. This route for the effectiveness of intervention might be termed the 
‘coordination channel’”. 
Modeling the weights   as a time-varying function would therefore allow to model the 
announcement effects of an intervention explicitly. So far we assumed that our interventions are not 
announced and conducted secretly. Thus, we concentrated on the power of the central bank to transitorily 
affect the exchange rate, and by this to influence the trading rule of the chartists. If the intervention rule is 
well designed, we then got a longer-lasting effect on the exchange rate. In our view the announcement of 
an intervention could be modeled by making   depend on the intervention. If the announcement is 
credible, the explicit weight of chartists becomes lower, in favor of the fundamentalists’ weight. 
t m
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